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Introduction 
The basic tenet of democracy is participation.  In Nepal’s current 
political context this is understood and emphasized by many 
sections of Nepal’s population. Yet if one were to observe the 
current political protests for the restoration of democracy (or as 
politicians say poorna prajaatantra or complete democracy), one 
would ask, where are the people? This was my exact sentiment 
after observing the 2003 and 2004 seven-student organizations’ 
joint student movement and then comparing this to the turnout of 
the current joint student movement.1  Where are the students?  Last 
year the joint student movement was able to bring both politically 
active (i.e., party affiliated) students and some non-active students 
from the public universities to the streets; at that time, the publicly 
perceived political gap lay between public university students and 
private university students. But today it is clear that only the 
student political party cadres, in smaller numbers, are protesting 
against the recent royal move.2 The gap has widened between the 
politically active and non-active students, and this has become a 
                                                 
1 This fieldwork was possible due to a Fulbright Institute for International 
Education grant. 
2 On February 1st, 2005, King Gyanendra announced that he was dissolving 
parliament, appointing a new government of which he would be the chairman, 
and instating a state of emergency.  He justified his action by claiming that he was 
saving democracy from the corrupt, ineffective politicians who were more 
interested in inter-party politics than in securing peace and solving the crisis of 
the mounting Maoist insurgency  He then proceeded to detain mainstream 
politicians and active students, forcing people either to go underground or to be 
arrested.  Some people were held up for five months, although most were released 
by the Supreme Court order under the habeas corpus law. 
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central factor in political analysts’ articulation of the uncertainty of 
democracy’s future.3   
The risk involved in protesting this increasingly autocratic 
state may be cited as the most apparent reason why people are not 
struggling for their democratic rights on the streets. But as with 
most political issues, the public’s lack of support to protest the 
King’s political coup goes much deeper. The division between who 
is political (party activists who claim to be fighting for democratic 
rights) and who is not, may have become more obvious after the 
King’s appropriation of state power on February 1st when one 
considers who was in jail or in hiding versus who was not, but this 
gap has been widening ever since the 1990 people’s movement, 
which brought democracy. In this paper I will consider this 
widening gap between political and non-political students as a 
symptom of the larger political problem: political parties’ 
disconnection from the general population, their constituents. 
Currently, very few people are invested in student politics as the 
necessary democratic exercise that student political activists ideally 
describe it as. By analyzing the changing historical role of student 
unions and their relationship with their mother organizations, the 
political parties, I hope to demonstrate the narrowing opportunity 
for student political organizations to be an effective political force 
due to their entrenched organizational set up, which is becoming 
anachronistic in the increasingly private educational environment 
that has developed since 1990.   
                                                 
3 The larger, more significant gap in the current political dynamic of Nepal is that 
between rural and urban experiences for Nepali citizens. Since this research was 
conducted within Kathmandu Valley with university students who represent 
about 5 percent of their generation, this paper will concentrate on the gap between 
politically active and non-active students, focussing on the dynamic within the 
universities, rather than address the more general urban and rural gap that a large 
literature on the Maoist conflict addresses (Acharya 2003; Fujikura 2003; Hutt (ed.) 
2004; Lawoti 2003; Pettigrew 2003; Shneiderman 2003; and Thapa 2002 and 2003). 
The perspective of university students represents a small proportion of their 
generations’ population but has a large impact on the success or failure of 
mainstream party politics, which I hope to demonstrate in this paper.  
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The Political Conception of Youth and Nepali Student Political 
Participation 
Nepali students have long had an integral role in Nepal’s political 
development. Over fifty-five years ago, Nepali students began 
their struggle to establish state-wide democracy and students are 
still at the fore of making radical political demands, standing on 
the political ground gained by student activists before them. It is 
important not only to acknowledge this historical precedent and its 
impact on the shaping of student politics, but one must consider 
Nepali conceptions of youth and the youth generation’s role in 
politics. When asked, older Nepali politicians4 have articulated to 
me that the youth are at a liminal period in their lives in which 
their own hopes are based in tradition and aspirations of the 
previous generations but their flexible perspective allows them to 
conceive possibilities their parents did not. In other words, they 
embrace a politics of fulfilment, which imagines a future society 
attaining more adequately what present society has left 
unaccomplished (Benhabib 1986: 27). This, coupled with the 
determination to achieve and the daring of age to opt for action 
over the risks involved, has made the youth a valuable asset in the 
struggle for democracy in Nepal. The older political generation 
takes advantage of the youth’s enthusiasm and idealism to 
mobilize the students’ future-oriented ambitions in order to 
accomplish what they have not been able to achieve in the past. 
This may seem like a cynical analysis, but it is important to 
untangle the idealized discourse of youth and the forty-year 
dynamic of student organizations becoming sister organizations to 
the political parties.  Within this dynamic there is a discursive play 
between autonomy and institutional culture. Autonomy and 
institutional culture coexist in tension with one another. It is the 
institutional culture of the student organizations that students 
must operate within in order to advance in politics, but it is 
                                                 
4 It is important to note that most Nepali politicians were active in student politics. 
Their responses to inquiries about the role of youth in politics both try to justify 
and give import to their own impact on politics as youth, as well as their 
interpretation of the role of youth today, who are below them in the political 
hierarchy.  
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through autonomy from the political parties that the students 
perceive of themselves having a larger impact (on an individual 
and group level) on society. This disjuncture is underscored by 
people’s articulations of youth and their perceived roles and 
limitations in politics.  
Nepal’s formalized struggle for democracy is marked by 
the revolution of 1950, a political manoeuvre coordinated between 
the Nepali Congress and King Tribhuvan (an ineffective 
figurehead) to overthrow the Rana regime, which had 
monopolized political power since 1846.  Multi-party democracy 
with a constitutional monarch was established after the King fled 
to India for refuge and the Nepali Congress conducted a military 
assault on the Rana state infrastructure.  Many of the participants 
in this rebellion were students who had been exiled to India in 
1947 for participating in the student movement Jayatu Sanksritam 
(‘Victory to Sanskrit’). This student movement was the first 
recorded organized protest by students against the Rana regime.  
At the time, Sanskrit was the only subject offered at Nepal’s only 
university.  The students organized themselves in order to demand 
that the curriculum be expanded to include mathematics and 
science. This movement occurred despite massive risk to the 
students; historically, any political or anti-Rana activity was 
severely repressed. Three years previously, three individuals were 
hanged for employing the Bhagavad Gita as a public metaphor to 
criticize the regime. It was surprising to students that the Rana 
regime submitted to their demand for an expanded curriculum, 
which encouraged them to continue their struggle to include the 
humanities as well. But the authority of the Rana regime had 
tolerated enough; they ordered raids on the campuses, imprisoned 
students while others were exiled to India. Many of these exilees 
were the founders of the Nepali Congress and later the Communist 
Party of Nepal. They participated in Mahatma Gandhi’s Quit India 
movement, which greatly influenced these future politicians’ 
struggle for democracy in Nepal (Hoftun, et al 1999: 5). 
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During the decade of “multi-party democracy” that was to 
follow,5 students at the university level began to move away from 
politics. They created a Student Federation that focussed on the 
wellbeing of students.  This collaboration was based on the notion 
that students should not be involved in party politics but rather in 
forming a national consensus, and that the best way to do that was 
to raise the issue of students’ rights in a unified voice (Hoftun, et al 
1999: 38). The student federations were organized according to the 
different zones of Nepal; they represented students of different 
regions rather than varying political ideologies. During this time, 
student activities were “norm-oriented,” concentrating on specific 
goals such as curriculum enlargement, campus facilities, and the 
quality of education (Altbach 1967: 87). Concurrently, the tenet of 
protecting students’ rights and interests became one of the 
justifications for the student organizations’ right to exist. The claim 
of protecting students’ rights established the student organizations 
as the representative of the students, which has since been 
articulated as one of the main roles of student organizations and 
used to validate their mandate.   
The student organizations were in an interesting position in 
the post-democratic era of the sixties and seventies.6  Since they 
had already been established as officially non-partisan, they were 
allowed to continue during the Panchayat rule. But the autocratic 
nature of the Panchayat government inevitably made any dissent 
                                                 
5 The era was a democracy only by decree, not by practice.  It was mainly a decade 
of intrigue, inquiry, meddling from India, odd coalitions, and attempted coups, as 
the struggle for power between the palace and the Nepali Congress oligarchy 
continued.  The main tenets of the 1951 India-engineered Delhi agreement that 
was signed by King Tribhuvan and the Nepali Congress were a constituent 
assembly and free and open elections.  The constituent assembly never took place.  
The elections did take place in 1959, one year before King Mahendra, Tribhuvan’s 
son, declared a one party Panchayat system (government run by his appointees, in 
cooperation with him) in which all other political parties were illegal. 
6 The history that I am laying out here is compiled from interviews (in May and 
June 2004) with Narahari Acharya (Central Committee Member of Nepali 
Congress), Ganesh Shyam Bhushal (CPN-UML Theory and Ideology Training 
Department), and Shribhadra Sharma (who had served both as General Secretary 
of the Nepali Congress of 1960 and as a Panchayat Minister). 
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political. During this time all of the student movements that 
occurred began as “norm-oriented” but quickly developed into 
“value-oriented”7 movements that took an ideological stance in 
reaction to harsh Panchayat suppression. It was at this time that 
student organizations became the activity of student politics, rather 
than a broader activity in which some politicians happened to 
participate. Ideological squabbles between students arose due to 
the priority of students’ partisanship with underground political 
parties and differences of opinion on how to depose of the 
Panchayat government and reinstate democracy. The All Nepal 
National Free Students Union (ANNFSU), which was originally 
developed in reaction to the formation of the Panchayat-backed 
National Student Forum, had become a Communist stronghold 
around 1968. In reaction to this, in 1970, the Nepali Congress 
formed its sister organization, called Nepal Students Union, for its 
students. Together, all the students’ organizations held campus 
elections within the Free Student Union. These elections came to 
symbolize political possibilities and served as proxies for 
democratic elections that could not occur at a national level.  The 
changing nature of student organizations’ activity no longer 
allowed the students to rally around pragmatic reform within the 
university context; now everything the students would want to 
fight for had to be fought on the basis of regaining the rights of free 
citizens. This marked the beginning of a historical trend that the 
monarchy has yet to realize. While Nepali citizens have their 
rights, most citizens, including the students, are satisfied to 
concentrate on material reform. But when fundamental rights are 
curbed, they become overtly political and ideological, which 
emboldens their tactics of dissent and protest. 
In 1971, the Panchayat government tried to ban 
independent student organizations, but the Supreme Court 
declared that they were not political organizations and therefore 
could not be constitutionally banned. This incident further 
                                                 
7 Philip Altbach distinguished between a “norm-oriented” movement, one 
concerned with specific goals and generally the product of a specific limited issue, 
and a “value-oriented” movement, which is concerned with broad, ideological 
issues (1967: 87). 
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cemented the historical relationship between the banned parties 
and student organizations.  The student organizations could then 
serve as the legal wings of the parties in order to keep democratic 
politics alive through tactics of dissent and political indoctrination.  
But between 1975 and 1979, student politics was deeply impacted 
by the new educational policy, one of the clauses of which argued 
that student organizations were detrimental to the new policy and 
would therefore be prohibited.8  It has been explained to me that 
this policy, which was heavily funded by American development 
dollars, was actually a ploy by the Panchayat government to secure 
its position by crafting a curriculum that made students favourable 
to the state. Many politicians and students still regard that 
education policy with suspicion as a Panchayat machination that 
did not address the needs of the people, but rather implemented 
policy that eliminated dissent. At an objective level, the new 
educational policy introduced a semester system with regular 
exams. This left little time for politics, and student organizations 
became inactive during the era of the new education policy (1975-
1979). 
The new education policy slowly started disintegrating due 
to lack of support from students and teachers. It saw its fall in 1979 
when a movement broke out nationwide over a minor incident.  
Approximately a thousand students were marching to the 
Pakistani embassy to protest the unjust execution of J. A. Bhutto.  
The police would not let the students through one of the main 
thoroughfares because their procession would block traffic at a 
time when the King was scheduled to be travelling in the area. The 
students demanded to be allowed to proceed but were refused and 
clashes broke out between the students and policemen.  By this 
time the students’ gathering was no longer about the execution of 
Bhutto, it was also about suppression. In the days that followed 
there were protests throughout the country that resulted in police 
brutality and several deaths. Such an escalation had not been 
                                                 
8 Despite a Supreme Court ruling, the Constitutional Reform Committee passed 
this bold reform.  Some say that this was possible due to the regional climate of 
authoritarianism caused by Indira Gandhi’s state of emergency in India. (Hoftun, 
et al 1999: 86) 
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expected on a nationwide scale, so King Birendra9 ordered a royal 
commission to investigate the students’ demands. The student 
action committee, which consisted of three students, Bal Bahadur 
K.C. (Nepali Congress affiliate), Shai Lak Karki (pro-Moscow 
affiliate), and Tanka Karki (United Marxist Leninist affiliate), 
reached an agreement with the commission, which ended the new 
education policy, abolished entrance exams to university (which 
made university entrance accessible to all those who had passed 
the National School Leaving Examination), allowed for 
independent unions on a national level, and abolished the 
Rastrabadi Bidhyarthi Mandal (National Student Forum), the pro-
Panchayat student organization accused of orchestrating attacks 
against student protesters. This was a victory for the student 
movement: they had achieved significant reform at the university 
level, but they were still unable to effect change at the state level.  
The next day, May 22, 1979, as these three representatives were 
reporting the outcome of the talks, an outcry arose among the 
students that they had not addressed the ultimate spirit of the 
movement. They painted two of the student negotiators’ faces 
black10 and paraded them through the streets. The demonstration 
accrued about twenty-five thousand protestors and culminated in 
the burning of a government newspaper office and the destruction 
of public vehicles in front of the Royal Nepal Airways Corporation 
office. The next day, May 24, 1979, King Birendra announced that 
he would allow a nationwide referendum whereby the people 
could choose between a multi-party system and the Panchayat-
style government. He allowed the underground parties to 
campaign in preparation for the referendum.  Ganesh Man Singh, 
the general secretary of Nepali Congress at that time, claimed, 
                                                 
9 Birendra’s rule began in 1972 and his style was quite different from his father’s. 
Though when he began his rule he planned to enforce his father’s constitution of 
1962, he was open to reform, working with liberal Panchayat ministers and at 
times with illegal political parties. 
10 In the context of the political struggle for democracy, black is equated with 
regression.  As a political tactic, protesters will often hold black flags, particularly 
on April 8th, which marks King Mahendra’s dissolution of democracy in  1960, 
and October 14th, when his grandson Gyanendra (the current king) dissolved 
parliament in 2001. 
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“Only foolish men can believe that a free and fair referendum will 
be possible under Panchayat Rule” (Hoftun, et al 1999: 91). Many 
other leaders were suspicious of such a move, though eventually 
the parties worked together to campaign for the national 
referendum. Ultimately, the government won the referendum.11 
Many are cynical of the reasons for the Panchayat system’s victory, 
and believe the issues range from access to resources to vote 
rigging. 
For the next decade the parties were officially banned but 
operated in a liminal space not sanctioned by the authorities. They 
were visible, they had offices and political programs, but they were 
not legally allowed to do so. The student organizations, on the 
other hand, were legal entities that could operate in their official 
capacity.  It was at this time that the student organizations became 
established as the limbs of the political organizations. Previously, 
while they may have assisted political parties as affiliates, they 
exercised some degree of autonomy due to the constraints under 
which the parties worked. But after the national referendum, the 
parties’ existence was vindicated and they gained the clout to 
organize political dissent. If the students wanted to participate, 
they did so in cooperation with the parties. In other words, the 
student organizations’ role as sister organization to the parties 
became entrenched. Their responsibilities included hosting 
political programmes and arranging logistics and publicity, as well 
as conducting political indoctrination on the campuses. Due to 
their legal status, the student organizations had rights their parties 
did not which appeared to give them autonomy but also cemented 
their relationship with political parties as sister organizations. In 
other words, student organizations were the vehicle through which 
the parties exercised influence.  
The combination of being organized together with the 
parties and their perceived autonomy from the parties served the 
students well during the 1990 people’s movement, but that was not 
what defined the success of this movement. Unlike movements in 
the past, this was not merely opposition from the elite political 
                                                 
11 Of the 7,111,000 registered voters, 2.4 million voted for the Panchayat system 
and 2 million voted for the multi-party system (Hoftun, et al 1999: 93). 
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leaders backed by party cadres or a student movement; it included 
the urban public, nationwide. Over the course of the movement 
there were mounting protests, sit-ins, strikes, torch rallies, 
blackouts, and signature campaigns run by every type of 
professional, political, and communal organization.  After 80,000 
people protested in the city of Patan they were able to seize control 
of the city and cut it off from Kathmandu by digging trenches at all 
points of access.  They declared their city to be a zone free from the 
historical suppression of the Panchayat government. At the 
movement’s peak, an estimated half million people congregated in 
the centre of Kathmandu which is thought to be the largest 
gathering recorded in Nepali history (Hoftun, et al 1999: 131). 
As the movement unfolded, the students exercised 
autonomy and this became integral to the movement’s momentum. 
Many party leaders were arrested either before the movement 
began, or soon after during periodic sweeps that were conducted 
in anticipation of the programme announced by the joint parties. 
This programme was a reaction to the palace ignoring their 
ultimatum to introduce major political reform. The lines of 
communication and influence that were established between the 
parties and their sister organizations over the last decade allowed 
the students to be able to carry out the work that party leaders 
were unable to do, primarily getting people to the streets.12  
Though everyone was coordinated toward one goal, the students 
did gain autonomy at this point, because they needed to rely on 
their own ability to strategize protest from hour to hour over the 
chaotic two-month course of the movement.  This combination of 
commitment to their parties’ ideals and situational autonomy 
during the movement served the student activists in another way 
beyond the success of democracy.  For the first time since the 1950 
movement, their actions secured the possibility for positions of 
power in the multi-party government that followed. They were 
heroes in previous movements, but all they gained were 
                                                 
12 This also meant that students were the bearers of the brunt of most of the police 
violence. When captured, they were brutally tortured, which did not happen as 
routinely to party leaders, and of the approximately fifty people who died during 
the movement, two thirds were students. 
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illegitimate positions in the parties that the Panchayat government 
had banned. But from 1990 onwards, the students invested 
themselves not only in their political ideology, but also in a 
legitimately sanctioned political career. 
In the post-1990 democratic era, student organizations had 
a co-dependent relation with the parties. In fact, for the first time in 
political history, it was possible for one’s tenure as a student to be 
the beginning of a guaranteed political career. But also during this 
period, the students returned to the campuses. Their movements at 
this time once again became norm-oriented and they contested 
issues like tuition increases, facility improvement, and petrol and 
transportation price decreases.13 They did not have reason to fight 
on ideological grounds, so they agitated for issues that concerned 
the student population and general public. The nature of these 
student movements according to the students’ convenient 
description—that they are social movements that served the larger 
public good—worked on a number of different levels that 
benefited both the students and the politicians. The process of 
student movements and the discourse around them were exploited 
as general categories that attempted to perpetuate public 
commitment to party ideals regardless of whether the parties were 
presently following those ideals. The movements allowed the 
youth to stir things up, which they were traditionally assumed to 
do in the name of justice. From the positive and negative 
sentiments concerning post-1991 student movements that I 
gathered from students, politicians, and general citizens during 
interviews, it seems that the student movements fulfilled two 
purposes. First, it provided the students a forum in which they felt 
they made a difference; it allowed them to feel personally invested 
in the political process, but within a controlled sphere that did not 
                                                 
13 There were two movements that went beyond pragmatic demands and which 
could be considered calls for justice.  The first was the march to the border in 1994. 
The ANNFSU (All Nepal National Free Student Union) students marched from 
Kathmandu to the Indian border carrying Nepali flags.  They did this to oppose 
the encroachment on the border by the Indian government.  The second was the 
2001 signature campaign that demanded that the prince, Paras Bikram Shaha 
(now the crown prince), be charged with manslaughter for killing of a prominent 
Nepali pop star.  Over one million signatures were collected for this campaign. 
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challenge their mother organizations, which were running the 
state.  Second, publicity was a strong motivator, which kept the 
parties in the limelight, just one step removed from the students, 
because their future generations were being represented in the 
media to be on the streets fighting for the rights of the common 
man.  These movements also served as performances that allowed 
Nepali citizens a glimpse of the coming generation that had 
identified and would change all that was wrong with Nepal, 
despite the fact that their mother organizations were not currently 
doing so. More specifically, the movements exhibited the ability of 
budding young politicians to run an organisation. There was also a 
trend that the students affiliated with the parties who had 
parliamentary rule tended to be the instigators of these 
movements. This dynamic allowed the ruling party to have fixed 
demands put upon them that they were then able to fulfil, which 
portrayed the party as heeding the voice of the people by either 
giving in to or compromising with the students’ demands 
(Snellinger, forthcoming).   
It was not until after 2002 when King Gyanendra interfered 
in the parliamentary process that the role of student movements 
returned to a value orientation. The students assisted the five 
political parties, who were carrying out a joint movement against 
regression (from democracy), by fulfilling their traditional roles: 
arranging the logistics, advertising of political programs, and being 
on the front lines of protest. Since 2003, the students have 
undertaken two joint movements independent of the parties.  The 
first was in April 2003, in which their objective was to decrease the 
petrol prices. During this movement they spoke about the need to 
reinstate parliament and declared their support for the five-party 
joint movement against regression, but most people admitted that 
this movement was norm-based and focussed on their agenda. It 
was not until Devi Ram Poudel, a student of the Butwal Multiple 
Campus, was shot dead by policemen on April 8, 2003 during a 
staged traffic jam in protest of the oil price hikes that this 
movement took a new turn. The students immediately demanded 
the resignation of the King’s appointed Prime Minister and the 
reinstatement of the parliament.  Lokendra Bahadur Chand, then 
Prime Minister, did resign, but was replaced by another appointee 
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of the King. And the petrol prices were decreased. A student leader 
said to me, “It was at this time that we realized what was at risk.  
The issue was no longer the price of petrol but the principle of 
protesting the price of petrol. Our democratic rights were at stake 
and that changed the nature of the movement. It had to change. 
There was so much at risk, including the honour of a martyr.”  
After this, as sister organizations, the students stepped up their 
support for the movement against regression.14   
It was not until December 2003 that the students declared 
their independent movement. After a protest programme on 
December 16th, 2003 acknowledging ‘Democracy Day,’15 three 
student leaders were arrested and charged with sedition for 
publicly demanding a republic during their speeches.  Such a 
charge had been unheard of in the post-1990 political era.  To many 
activists this not only indicated the current state of stalled 
democracy but a step backwards to Panchayat autocracy in which 
free speech was also curtailed.  The mayhem of the following days 
discouraged the government from officially charging the students 
with sedition, and they released them.  This turn of events further 
emboldened the students.  Since the government was unable to 
bring itself to enforce sedition charges, the students used the 
opportunity to take out their own joint movement of seven Free 
Student Union (FSU) organizations. Their mission was to radicalize 
the discourse of the political parties’ movement against regression 
by taking the risk to make political demands that their more 
conservative mother organizations (the political parties) did want 
to take. The students not only saw this as a move against the King’s 
autocratic actions but also as an opportunity to carve a space of 
political autonomy for themselves. The following quote from one 
of the student leaders who was arrested sums up the change in the 
students’ role after 2002: 
                                                 
14 It was at this time that I arrived in Nepal for my fieldwork, so all accounts from 
this point forward are based on my field observations, analysis, and interviews. 
15 Democracy Day marks the anniversary of the day King Mahendra formally 
proposed that national elections will occur on February 18, 1959, one year before 
he dismissed the elected parliament and instated the Panchayat system of 
government.  
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Yesterday the student organization’s role was only to 
powerfully assist the parties. They were treated as 
nurseries, which used to supply plants for the parties.  In 
the nursery the seeds used to be watered and fertilized. The 
role of the student organizations was limited to this.  It was 
not considered in a broader perspective than this. Our work 
was to make Nepali Congress win the election and to make 
the college students and school students familiar with 
Congress’s theories, by making them educated in congress 
theories and to produce cadres for Nepali Congress. We did 
not have the situation to conduct struggle within Congress.  
But now because of the students’ movement and the faith 
that we have obtained (from public), our role is not limited 
to that.  In the overall construction of the country our role is 
to be the prime mover. We are the force with most 
potential; the student organizations have realized this 
during this situation. Therefore the mainstream politics 
should not be driven only by the political party but we 
must also interfere in it. Yesterday we did not interfere in it; 
we did not take part in how the state was run.  The parties 
used to fight but we did not care. In twelve years of 
parliamentary democracy a lot of defects came and we 
never spoke. Our opinion is that we were limited—“your 
work is to do politics in the campus, your work is to take 
part in Free Student Union elections, your role is to assist 
the parties in the elections,” this is what was said to us.  
And we said yes, we understood in a wrong way. But today 
we are interfering.  To be able to point a finger at the parties 
saying that you cannot compromise with the King in an 
inappropriate way means we are also in the mainstream of 
politics.16   
 
Another student leader from ANNFSU, All Nepal National Free 
Student Union, (Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist 
                                                 
16 Interview conducted on January 28, 2004. The translation from Nepali was done 
by the author. 
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Leninst affiliate) articulated this sentiment by claiming that the 
public support their political movement more than they do the 
parties’ movement. His reasoning was that the political parties 
were at fault in their governing practices during multi-party 
democracy and that their incompetence brought about this political 
crisis.  The students, on the other hand, had committed no injustice 
upon the public and were aware of the mistakes of their leaders, 
which they would therefore avoid committing. Ultimately, he 
believed that the students were in a unique position between the 
public and the parties. They believed that their political position 
allowed them to fight for the true priorities of the public.   
The ideals stated above give purpose to the students’ 
struggles, which allows them to have the conviction that they need 
to sustain the dedication and passion for a protracted movement.  
But, all too often, ideals hover over reality and sometimes they fail 
to coalesce within the structural limitations of the political system.  
In the spring of 2004, the King’s second appointed prime minister 
resigned.  He then asked the original prime minister whom he had 
dismissed, Sher Bahadur Deuba, to resume his position and form a 
coalition government.17 The CPN-UML was the only party of the 
joint five parties who agreed to join Deuba’s coalition government. 
The students from the CPN-UML’s affiliate, ANNFSU, viewed this 
as a compromise and did not agree with their mother 
organization’s move. Since the UML works on an intra-party 
process of consent, they create a platform with no dissenting voice.  
This policy is also followed by their student organization, unless 
they are strategically mobilizing their voice as an independent 
                                                 
17 At the time Deuba had originally been dismissed from the position of prime 
minister, he was a member of Nepali Congress.  But the dismissal turned out to be 
the last scuffle that he and the President of Nepali Congress, Girija Prasad Koirala, 
were willing to have. A split in the party resulted and Deuba became the 
president of the newly created Nepali Congress (Democratic). The Nepali 
Congress (Democratic) was not a participant in the five party joint movement 
against regression due to the refusal of Koirala.  Rather, they took out their own 
protests with their student organization, Nepal Student Union (Democratic). 
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voice of dissent.18 I recall more than a few sombre moments of 
frustration in the ANNFSU party office over their mother 
organization’s decision. Even though ANNFSU was unable to 
continue to participate in the joint student movement, their 
presence was noticeably absent as they lingered on the roof of their 
party office staring down longingly at Ratna Park19 immediately 
below them as their fellow students continued their 
uncompromised struggle against the King’s aggressive move.  One 
student begrudgingly admitted that the other student 
organizations were in no better position than they were. They were 
still on the streets only because their parties were still there.  It just 
happened that in this situation, they were the ones to bear the 
shame of compromise. But these students were also the CPN-
UML’s most vocal critics when it became obvious that the Deuba 
coalition was not working. 
Three months after the CPN-UML joined the government, 
the Nepali Congress dissolved the central committee of Nepal 
Student Union.  Since 1990 there have been nine central committee 
administrations of NSU; eight have been dissolved by Nepali 
Congress, despite the supposition that it is technically against the 
constitution of the Nepal Student Union. Some of the dissolved 
leaders and other party cadres have speculated that this move was 
made because the leadership of the Nepal Student Union central 
committee was not under the proper influence of the Nepali 
Congress leadership, and in order to curb any rogue activity—
despite its success in terms of the number of participants in the 
                                                 
18 At various times this has been both an independent strategic move by the 
ANNFSU, and a strategy in cooperation with CPN-UML with larger realpolitik 
considerations. 
19 Ratna Park is a major thoroughfare a few thousand yards from the palace.  It 
has gained its reputation as the nexus of political agitation in Kathmandu, flanked 
by the Democracy Wall. On the opposite corner is the ANNFSU office and a police 
barrack is situated on another corner. Many political protests begin and end at this 
point with speeches given there. This location is also a prestigious place for a 
political protester to be arrested. On a number of occasions I have observed 
negotiations between protesters and police, where the police ask the protestors to 
come quietly and the protesters respond, “There is only one place I will allow you 
to arrest me. Take me to Ratna Park and then you can arrest me.” 
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street agitations—it was better to have central committee-
appointed students who would follow Nepal Congress Party 
command. Many people say that it is issues like this that highlight 
the weakness of both the student organizations and the parties.  It 
also further cements the students’ roles as cadres who are 
politically oriented within party ideals. And although one of their 
articulated motives in their movement is autonomy, or the power 
to change the system, they are ultimately beholden to the political 
parties.  This relationship not only limits them but also makes them 
vulnerable to increased political suppression in the current 
environment. 
Due to the continuing political crisis, the students have 
continued their movement.  It has ebbed and flowed as one would 
expect with any protracted movement, but the dedicated few have 
sustained and reacted according to what the political context has 
dictated. The recent palace appropriation of the democratic process 
in February 2005 has drastically changed the political playing field. 
The fact that the students were tracked down and arrested just as 
the mainstream politicians were, prior to the King’s public 
announcement,20 is testament to the lack of ambiguity in their role; 
the students are officially a political threat. During the state of 
emergency there was a prioritized list circulated among the 
security forces of whom to arrest regardless of whether there was 
any legal reason to do so.  Category A contained activists who 
could incite the masses, Category B contained central committee 
members and elites of the political parties, and Category C 
contained common cadres who were disobeying state of 
emergency statutes. This situation gave the arrest of particular 
student politicians priority over seasoned elite politicians, 
depending on their charisma and ability to convince the masses to 
oppose the state of emergency.  The majority of political detainees, 
                                                 
20 During this announcement, the King claimed that in order to save democracy 
from the corrupt, ineffective politicians who were more interested in inter-party 
politics than in securing peace and security, and in order to save the country from 
the mounting Maoist insurgency, he was dissolving parliament, appointing a new 
government of which he would be the chairman, and instating a state of 
emergency. 
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who have been charged under the Public Securities Act,21 have 
been students. Many analysts consider the recent events to be 
history repeating itself irrespective of established international 
discourse that claims democracy is a right to dignity. This 
sentiment of historical repetition needs to be acknowledged but 
due to the students’ evolving role in democracy, they need to 
navigate this historically perpetual event differently than they have 
in the past. Their struggle right now is a value-oriented struggle for 
the rights of the people and for the possibility that they can exist as 
political entrepreneurs. Since February 2005 even their discourse 
and appeals have changed. They are now adopting the human 
rights discourse of international justice, as well as expanding their 
scope of appeal beyond their Nepali constituents. Throughout their 
history, the students have been challenged by constraints and 
taken advantage of opportunities through tactics of adopting, 
adapting, and inventing, in order to declare, Andolan jarichha - ‘the 
movement continues’. 
I have briefly detailed the history of student political 
activity and the nascent relationship between the student 
organizations and their mother organizations, the political parties, 
in order to demonstrate the limitations and the ideals attributed to 
students’ roles in politics by the students, the politicians, and the 
public. All of these actors draw on student politics’ historicity to 
either apply substance to their role or to dismiss it as contrived 
political tactics. But within these articulations it is clear that the 
youth are perceived to have political capital and that has been co-
opted by the parties, in turn curbing its potential to effect change.  
 
                                                 
21 This act was ratified in 1951 soon after democracy was instated.  It claimed that 
someone could be held in jail for up to nine months if they were a threat to 
society.  At that time it was used by the Nepali Congress to silence its opponents 
(Hoftun, 1999: 33).  Since 1951, it has been used by whatever regime was in power.  
During the first years of democracy it was not used but after the Maoist 
Insurgency of 1996 its usage has been increasing as the state has tried to curb 
“terrorism.”  Since 2003, King Gyanendra’s government has used it regularly to 
suppress dissent from the parties.  In its current form, someone can be held up for 
three months without a charge, and it can be renewed on a three month basis. 
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Politics of Exclusion: Post-1990 Politics and the Public 
In addition to the issue of student politics being incorporated into 
mainstream party politics, there are three other key factors that 
have influenced the gap between politically active students and 
non-active students. One consideration is that while there were no 
MA or PhD students in Nepal in 1950 and there were just 25022 
students at bachelors’ level then the number of students just at 
Master’s and PhD levels was as high as 207,211 in 2004.23 With this 
increased participation of students in the Nepali higher education 
system has come a larger and more diverse constituency that the 
student political organizations are able to represent. After all, 
student politics, like mainstream politics, largely remains an 
endeavour of high-caste, educated men. There may be more 
diversity on the university campus levels, but the central 
committees of the student organizations more or less directly 
mirror the central committees of their mother parties. Without the 
representation of students from all different backgrounds, it has 
been increasingly difficult for general students to believe that the 
student organizations represented their interests. Rather, the 
student organizations are a force with which one must negotiate in 
order to achieve administrative tasks like university admission and 
department enrolment. Furthermore, the sense of political 
exclusion that operates on a national level (see Lawoti 2005) is 
reflected on the campus level, because even though student politics 
can be perceived as an opportunity to enter into politics, it has 
become a reserved opportunity for those who are bred by the party 
leaders. As with many causes that struggle for the higher 
intentions of justice, once the opportunity for advancement 
becomes a valid possibility, the processes of streamlining 
competition and advancement are cultivated, which inevitably 
taints the ideological articulations that once gave weight to the 
struggle for ‘justice’. 
Citizens who did not see any opportunity in the political 
system took advantage of what was available to them in the post-
1990 democratic era: economic opportunity within the developing 
free market economy. This economic environment included a 
burgeoning private school industry. Today there are over 25,599 
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schools in the country and 8,547 of them private.22 The private 
school industry boomed with the demand of an increasingly 
privatized economy that was filling the gaps where government 
facilities were lacking. The state of government schools at all levels 
is poor and vulnerable to regular political strikes and 
machinations. One of the key selling points of private schools is 
that the student organizations’ influence did not reach into private 
campuses.  So those who did not perceive or were not interested in 
political opportunity, and could afford private education, paid not 
to have their lives interrupted by politics. Rather, people invested 
in quality private education in order to get ahead economically.  
This too has widened the political gap between the developing 
middle class, which is becoming technically and educationally 
oriented towards private sector jobs, and the political class, which 
often comes from the bottom ranks of poor public universities and 
are often improperly trained to pursue the political goal of public 
office.  
A lack of political or citizenship consciousness is often cited 
as another reason why people are passively observing the current 
political crisis. A few reasons may be suggested to explain this. 
First, during democracy the parties and the students concentrated 
only on political party indoctrination, which was dismissed by 
many as another form of power politics. The student organizations 
would extend their influence in the direction of the government 
secondary schools, higher secondary schools, colleges, and 
universities.  But usually the student organizations gain access to 
the lower level government schools through connections with the 
school administration that is affiliated with their political party, so 
the political indoctrination that the young students receive is that 
of contrived partisan politics.  They do not necessarily get cross-
platform inculcation into political ideologies from which they can 
choose their party affiliations. Rather, there is a continual 
campaign of extending political influence that is often a 
predetermined game of location to which students are vulnerable.  
The colleges and university campuses are the battlefields (both 
figuratively and literally) of student organizations. Student 
                                                 
22 Education Statistics of Nepal Education Ministry 1999, cited in Dahal (2001). 
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organization strongholds on campuses indicate the extent of 
influence the parties have on the campuses, and through the 
student politicians the parties constantly struggle for this access.  
Second, this style of party indoctrination has not been balanced 
with social studies courses that teach the students what the 
democratic state does and what they should expect of it, a course 
on cultivating citizenship that is common in the curricula of many 
other modern democratic nation states. The democratic state 
education systems never properly filled the void left by the 
removal of a Panchayat education system, which was very 
nationalist in tone. Today, Nepal’s political history is taught in the 
context of eras of leadership and coups that do not prepare 
students to think of themselves as the citizens for whom the state is 
being run and who determine the mandate of government. 
Furthermore, with the Sanskritic learning style of rote 
memorization entrenched in the Nepali education system, there is 
no opportunity to engage or question the type of nationalist history 
that is being taught. 
According to the 1990 constitution the King remains the 
chancellor of Tribhuvan University and Mahendra Sanskrit 
University, which involves rubber-stamping all official activity, 
including appointments and curriculum on all Tribhuvan-affiliated 
campuses. Although the position of chancellor was meant to be 
purely symbolic, so was the position of constitutional monarchy, 
yet the monarchy’s role has been easily manipulated, with the 
justification of Article 127 of the constitution, to become active 
twice since 2001. The proposal to make the King the chancellor of 
all other Nepali universities, including Kathmandu University, the 
one private university in the nation, is of concern to some 
university professors. They perceive this to be a tactic to entrench 
the King’s influence over the universities. The 2005 new National 
Education Act of the rajparishad (the governing counsel appointed 
by the King) has also raised eyebrows among those suspicious of 
the King’s desire to refill the vacuum of patriotic influence that was 
set in the curriculum, of which the political parties never took 
advantage in order to build a solid understanding of what it means 
to be a democratic citizen. These manoeuvres are a testament to the 
vulnerable position of educational institutions. 
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With all of these political machinations for influence that 
are wrapped up in the notion of civic consciousness in Nepal, it 
should be mentioned that to all the generalizations that I am 
posing here there are exceptions. One prominent exception that I 
have observed in Kathmandu among college-educated youth is 
that there is a notion of citizenship consciousness but it is not 
necessarily connected to a political consciousness. They 
understand that the current political situation adversely affects 
them and that their rights are directly at stake. And even though it 
might not necessarily impact their daily lives, they know that they 
need a free and open political environment for the development of 
the country. Their impasse is over how to make a difference.  The 
parties are offering a space on the streets to protest but they are 
perceived as a sector in this tripartite political debacle in which 
people see no benefit in participating. Many of the students have 
told me that they might be willing to participate, but ask, “How do 
we join the party protests?” They are unable to conceptualize how 
they can make a difference, especially if politically active students 
who seem to be capable and have gained popularity with the 
general public are being stymied by their mother organizations 
due to internal party politics. Ultimately, it is an issue of 
empowerment. If the general student population observes students 
who are dedicating their lives to politics being personally 
obstructed by their mother organizations, then how can they 
conceptualize making an impact? Many have presented this, and 
the lack of a clear agenda that people can support, as reasons for 
why there seems to be no room on the streets for the public to join 
with the political parties and student organizations. 
Even though student politics is espoused as, and at times in 
history has actually served as, a symbolically necessary democratic 
exercise, very few people are invested in it as such. Today, when it 
again needs to be at the forefront of the political struggle, students 
do not see a place for themselves in the political system.  A former 
finance minister who studied in America in the late 1960s 
explained to me that politically active students in Nepal did not 
seize the opportunity of multi-party democracy to create 
democratic culture on the campuses. There was not the same 
urgency to be active because democracy had won; people had their 
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rights. He pointed out that the universities may have become the 
training grounds for politics, but they should have simultaneously 
been the training grounds for active citizenship that holds the 
elected responsible to their actions. He summarized the problem in 
the following statement: 
 
When people think of democracy in Nepal, they think of 
party politics, something they are not a part of. Democracy 
needs to be owned by all, it needs to be a culture of 
ownership, and with ownership comes responsibility to 
hold the system accountable.  During democracy in Nepal, 
the politicians never compelled the citizens to own their 
democracy, of course not; they did not want to be held 
accountable.  But the politicians can’t get upset. For fifteen 
years they treated the public as a side note. Now the public 
is treating them as a side note. What the public does not 
understand is that democracy is more than the parties. 
Democracy is the economic opportunities that have become 
possible for them, and democracy is their right to do more 
than just protest. When they start losing this part of 
democracy, then they will begin to understand and take a 
more active role.23 
 
This sentiment was expressed to me by a number of student 
activists when I pushed them on this issue of student political 
participation.  They said that those who have benefited most from 
democracy are those who have done the least to secure democracy.  
They were referring to the citizens who have been able to take 
advantage of the private education system and improved their 
economic opportunity as a result. Those who actively participate 
are participating in a politics that has failed to include the public. 
This lack of conceived space has caused the public to become 
ambivalent to the political system, and their ambivalence is now 
being manipulated as a mandate to the monarchy, which is slowly 
closing the political space to everyone.  So rather than a democratic 
                                                 
23 This is a translation of an informal interview I had with the informant on June 
23, 2005. 
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culture, a culture of disjuncture has developed between the public 
and the political parties that has directly threatened the democratic 
political system.  
 
Transfiguration: Politics and the State of University  
In closing, it is important to consider the popular question in 
Marxist, Leninist, Maoist theory: what is to be done?  When I asked 
people for solutions, most do not suggest revolution but many 
agree that the ultimate end of democracy has become convoluted 
and therefore the means need to be re-evaluated in order to secure 
a more comprehensive form of democracy.  Can we call this a crisis 
of student politics? Perhaps not, but rather there is a crisis of 
politics, of which the students are but one component. Student 
politics may not yet be anachronistic, but at a time of political crisis 
its institutional culture seems to be limiting its ability to fulfil the 
possibilities that many attribute to its political capital. In order to 
survive as a relevant political force the student organizations, like 
their parties, need to re-evaluate their role in the state, in society, 
and in the universities. Rather than being trapped by others’ 
definitions of who they are and what role they serve as a political 
entity, perhaps the student politicians need to reconnect with their 
own generation, the mass of people in the country whom they 
claim to represent. This approach must include the larger youth 
population that has not had the opportunity of education; the 
students must learn to communicate and represent the needs of 
those who have been left behind by the era of democracy and 
development. By creating an environment of inclusive politics that 
incorporates all sectors of their generation, they can demonstrate 
the ideals of democracy at work and be an example to the 
generations before and after them.  Instead of adopting a politics of 
fulfilment, they can practise a politics of transfiguration, which 
emphasizes emergent needs, social relations, and modes of 
association, “which burst the utopian potential within the old” 
(Benhabib 1986: 27). This would be a more proactive, critical 
approach to the political impasse of democratic development, 
which would allow them the flexibility to uproot their institutional 
culture and transfigure it to be contemporarily relevant.  
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Another responsibility that all students have is the bettering 
of the state university environment. All sectors have taken 
advantage of the benefits the university has to offer, but no 
sector—the monarchy, the state, the parties, the students, or the 
public—has actively invested in it so that it can provide each with 
the quality for which it has the potential. An ex-vice chancellor of 
Tribhuvan University eloquently addressed this issue in a speech 
to the Public Administration Association of Nepal when he said: 
 
This university…has served Nepal over the past 45 
years…This premier national university has produced 
scholars, poets, ministers, artists, politicians, generals, and 
even rebels.  If this institution were a woman, she would 
have been now in the full bloom of her life, happy, 
contented, and blessed.  But, just for a few seconds imagine 
a woman sitting in that corner; her face as wrinkled as a 
walnut.  Her wasted body bent over a baby she is holding 
in the folds of her sari.  Her sunken cheeks bathed in tears.  
A woman in utter destitution….Ladies and Gentleman, this 
is what we have made Tribhuvan University today….but 
how would one describe the pain and agony of an 
institution…for institutions do not cry….this proud 
institution with such a glorious history is now without 
many friends.  Everyone has used her, misused her for his 
or her personal gain or political benefit.  It has been the 
victim of both rampant trade unionism of teacher and 
administration, and political activism of the students…Thus 
while the country’s premier national university continues to 
suffer, responsible public officials take satisfaction out of 
the proliferation of more efficient and market oriented 
institutions of higher education in the private sector.  But 
are national universities beyond redemption?...We cannot 
let this happen in a country like Nepal where only 5 percent 
of the university going age population attend universities 
or colleges.24  
                                                 
24 Speech given by Dr. Kedar Bhakta Mathema addressed to the Public 
Administration Association of Nepal (PAAN), August 28, 2004.  
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For Nepal to secure democracy, it needs education and educated 
citizens. If politics needs to be inclusive for democracy to 
strengthen, then education must also be inclusive.  If 95% of the 
student age population still needs to be incorporated into the 
higher-educated class, then there is need for quality state 
education. This is the responsibility of all; people need to hold the 
state accountable to provide quality education to all.  Until quality 
education is more than privilege, then democracy will always be 
fragile and vulnerable to the power politics that we have seen thus 
far in Nepal’s democratic history. 
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